OALJ Staff Markup Showing Changes Made By the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act of 1992
[Prepared by the staff of the Office of Administrative Law Judges on November 5, 1992. Revised on April 13, 1994.]
On October 9, 1992, Congress passed H.R. 776, the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act (the "Act"). President Bush signed it into law on October 24, 1992. The Act made several significant amendments to the whistleblower provision of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), section 210 (42 U.S.C. § 5851), including:
- Explicit coverage of internal complaints as protected activity
- A more comprehensive definition of "employer" which includes Department of Energy contractors and subcontractors
- Expansion of the time to file a complaint from thirty days to 180 days
- Mandatory reinstatement of complainants pending the Secretary's final order where it is recommended following a hearing that the complaint has merit
- A requirement that the complainant make a prima facie showing before the Department may investigate, with a further requirement that even if the prima facie showing is made, the complaint will not be investigated if the employer can establish by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the adverse personnel action in the absence of the complainant's protected activity
- Other modifications to the burden of proof analysis
The foregoing consists of a markup of section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851 based on the amendments occasioned by section 2902 of the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act (CNEPA).
Deletions are marked by Typewriter type. . Additions are marked by bold .
"Comments" are the comments of OALJ staff and are not part of the legislative history, unless specifically noted.
Please note that CNEPA renumbers section 210 of the ERA as section 211.
TITLE II--NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; NUCLEAR WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
* * * *
§ 5851. Employee protection
(a)
(1) Discrimination against employee
No employer , including a Commission licensee, an applicant for a Commission license, or a contractor or a subcontractor of a Commission licensee or applicant , may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee)--
(A) notified his employer of an alleged violation of this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.);
(B) refused to engage in any practice made unlawful by this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if the employee has identified the alleged illegality to the employer;
(C) testified before Congress or at any Federal or State proceeding regarding any provision (or any proposed provision) of this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
(1) (D) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.], or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
(2) (E) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or;
(3) (F) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Comment : This amendment ratifies the position of several circuit courts and the Secretary of Labor that reporting violations internally is protected activity. See Jones v. Tennessee Valley Authority , 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25777 (6th Cir. 1991) (by implication); Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc. , 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Brock , 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied , 478 U.S. 1011, 92 L.Ed.2d 724, 106 S. Ct. 3311 (1986); Goldstein v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc. , 86- ERA-36 (Sec'y Apr. 7, 1992), slip op. at 5-10, appeal docketed , No. 92-4576 (5th Cir. June 1, 1992); Willy v. The Coastal Corp. , 85-CAA-1 (Sec'y June 4, 1987), slip op. at 3-4, 8. The Fifth Circuit had taken the position that intracorporate activities are not covered under the ERA. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan , 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984). The amendments to the ERA appear to resolve the dispute against the Fifth Circuit's position.In a CAA case, however, the Fifth Circuit noted the Secretary's nonacquiescence on the internal complaint issue, and although it did not squarely address the nonacquiescence question, appeared to affirm its position that internal complaints are not covered. Willy v. Coastal Corp. , 855 F.2d 1160, n.13 (5th Cir. 1988) Hence, the internal complaint issue is not resolved for non-ERA cases.
(2) For purposes of this section, the term "employer" includes-(A) a licensee of the Commission or of an agreement State under section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2021);
(B) an applicant for a license from the Commission or such an agreement State;
Comment : An agreement state is one that has entered into a agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 2021 and has the authority to regulate the disposal of low-level waste under such agreement.
(C) a contractor or subcontractor of such a licensee or applicant; and(D) a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Energy that is indemnified by the Department under section 170 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210(d)), but such term shall not include any contractor or subcontractor covered by Executive Order No. 12344.
Comment : This section provides a more comprehensive definition of "employer." One significant addition to the definition is that DOE contractors and subcontractors are now considered "employers." According to Representative Wyden's statement in support of the Conference Report, Congress added this provision so that employees of private contractors would have the same rights, grievance procedures, and remedies that public contractors are afforded under the ERA. See 138 Cong. Rec. H11376 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Wyden). This provision has been said to provide new whistleblower protection for tens of thousands of contract employees at DOE nuclear weapons plants. Hebert, "Energy Bill Expands Protection for Whistleblowers at Nuclear Plants," NEXIS AP File (Oct. 12, 1992).Representative Wyden indicated that this amendment was made in response to a federal district court ruling that DOE contractors are not covered employers. See 138 Cong. Rec. H11376 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Mr. Wyden). The case he referred to is Bricker v. Rockwell Hanford Operation s , No. CY-90-3090-AAM, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18965 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 1991) (unpublished), in which the judge dismissed a case brought by a former employee of Westinghouse Hanford who had blown the whistle on safety violations at the DOE's Hanford nuclear reservation. The judge found that while government whistleblowers are protected under the ERA, Congress has deliberately refused to protect private contractor of the DOE. Id . Therefore, the plaintiff was not protected by the ERA because it was an employee of a private DOE contractor. Id.
Comment: Subparagraph (a)(2)(D) states that contractors and subcontractors of the DOE who are indemnified by the Department under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2210(d) are now considered "employers". Under 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d), the DOE may indemnify contractors and subcontractors who conduct activities that pose a risk to the public and are not subject to other financial protections under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Comment: Subparagraph (a)(2)(D) states that contractors and subcontractors covered under Executive Order No. 12,344 are not considered "employers" under the ERA. Executive Order 12,344 deals with the administration of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. This program is administered by the DOE and the Department of Navy and regulates every aspect of nuclear propulsion as it relates to the Navy.
(b) Complaint, filing and notification(1) Any employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of subsection (a) of this section may, within thirty days 180 days after such violation occurs, file (or have any person file on his behalf) a complaint with the Secretary of Labor (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the "Secretary") (in this section referred to as the "Secretary") alleging such discharge or discrimination. Upon receipt of such a complaint, the Secretary shall notify the person named in the complaint of the filing of the complaint and the Commission the Commission and the Department of Energy .
_________________________________________________________________ __________________(2) (A) Upon receipt of a complaint filed under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall conduct an investigation of the violation alleged in the complaint. Within thirty days of the receipt of such complaint, the Secretary shall complete such investigation and shall notify in writing the complainant (any person acting in his behalf) and the person alleged to have committed such violation of the results of the investigation conducted pursuant to this subparagraph. Within ninety days of the receipt of such complaint the Secretary shall, unless the proceeding on the complaint is terminated by the Secretary on the basis of a settlement entered into by the Secretary and the person alleged to have committed such violation, issue an order either providing the relief prescribed by subparagraph (B) or denying the complaint. An order of the Secretary shall be made on the record after notice and opportunity for public hearing. Upon the conclusion of such hearing and the issuance of a recommended decision that the complaint has merit, the Secretary shall issue a preliminary order providing the relief prescribed in subparagraph (B), but may not order compensatory damages pending a final order. The Secretary may not enter into a settlement terminating a proceeding on a complaint without the participation and consent of the complainant.
Comment : Commenting on the Conference Report, Representative Ford stated that once an Administrative Law Judge determines that a complaint has merit, the Secretary must, without delay, order the relief specified by section 210(b)(2)(B) (i.e., reinstatement and back pay). 138 Cong. Rec. H11444 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Ford). The Secretary may not grant compensatory damages, however, until a final order is issued. Id.Representative Ford indicated that the purpose of this section is to remedy the long delays claimants with meritorious cases experienced before receiving relief. Id . He referred to the experience of his constituent, Carolyn Larry as an example of this problem. s. Larry's relief was delayed five years from the time the administrative law judge issued his decision until the Secretary rendered her decision ordering relief. See Detroit Edison Company v. Department of Labor , No. 91-3737, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 8280 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1992) (unpublished); Larry v. Detroit Edison Co. , 86-ERA-32 (Sec'y June 28, 1991); Larry v. Detroit Edison Co. , 86-ERA-32 (ALJ Oct. 17, 1986).
The sentence added to this subparagraph (b)(2)(A) refers to a "recommended" decision. Evidently the drafters of the amendments had in mind the 29 C.F.R. Part 24 regulations, and specifically a hearing before an ALJ who recommends a decision to the Secretary.
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(B) If, in response to a complaint filed under paragraph (1), the Secretary determines that a violation of subsection (a) of this section has occurred, the Secretary shall order the person who committed such violation to (i) take affirmative action to abate the violation, and (ii) reinstate the complainant to his former position together with the compensation (including back pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment, and the Secretary may order such person to provide compensatory damages to the complainant. If an order is issued under this paragraph, the Secretary, at the request of the complainant shall assess against the person against whom the order is issued a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorneys' and expert witness fees) reasonably incurred, as determined by the Secretary, by the complainant for, or in connection with, the bringing of the complaint upon with the order was issued.(3) (A) The Secretary shall dismiss a complaint filed under paragraph (1), and shall not conduct the investigation required under paragraph (2), unless the complainant has made a prima facie showing that any behavior described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of subsection (a)(1) was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint.
(B) Notwithstanding a finding by the Secretary that the complainant has made the showing required by subparagraph (A), no investigation required under paragraph (2) shall be conducted if the employer demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of such behavior.
Comment : The purposes of subparagraphs (b)(3)(A) and (B) are twofold. First, subparagraph (b)(3)(A) is intended to reduce frivolous claims by requiring the complainant to make a prima facie showing before the Secretary may investigate the case. Se e 138 Cong. Rec. H11444 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Ford). Second, the employer bears a higher burden of proof than it has under the current case law. According to Representative Ford, Congress intended to replace the burden of proof enunciated in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyl e , 429 U.S. 274 (1977), to provide greater protection for whistleblowers who have been retaliated against. 138 Cong. Rec. H11444. Previously, these presumptions were established by case law and were not defined by the ERA.Elimination of frivolous complaints . Under the amendments, an initial assessment of the case is greatly accelerated. The complainant must make a prima facie showing to the Secretary that the protected activity was a "contributing factor" to the unfavorable personnel action. The Secretary is prohibited from conducting an investigation and must dismiss a complaint if the complainant fails to make this showing. Even when the complainant makes the prima facie showing, the Secretary must not investigate a case if the employer shows by "clear and convincing" evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action. See also 138 Cong. Rec. H11444 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Ford). This preliminary showing appears to contemplate a preliminary hearing before the Administrator.
According to Representative Ford, the complainant is free under current law to the pursue the case before an administrative law judge if the Secretary dismisses the complaint. Id. The actual language of the amendments to the Act, however, does not make an appeal right to an ALJ on this kind of dismissal clear, and the current regulations do not contemplate an initial determination on whether an investigation should be conducted.
[ EDITOR'S NOTE: Subsequent to preparation of this analysis, the Employment Standards Administration published for notice and comment proposed amendments to the regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 24 to implement the 1992 amendments to the ERA. Proposed section 24.5 provides for special procedures applicable only to investigations under the Energy Reorganization Act. Subparagraph (d)(1) of that proposed regulation provides:
(d)(1) Whenever the Administrator dismisses a complaint pursuant to this section without completion of an investigation, the Administrator shall give notice of the dismissal, which shall contain a statement of reasons therefor, by certified mail to the complainant, the respondent, and their representatives. At the same time the Administrator shall file with the Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, a copy of the complaint and a copy of the notice of dismissal. The notice of dismissal shall include notice that the dismissal shall become the final order of the Secretary denying the complaint unless within five business days of its receipt the complainant files with the Chief Administrative Law Judge by facsimile (fax), telegram, hand delivery, or next-day delivery service, a request for a hearing on the complaint.
59 Fed. Reg. 12510 (Mar. 16, 1994).]
Change in burden of proof . The amendments, according to Representative Ford, alter the employer's burden of proof established by the leading case, Mt. Healthy , 429 U.S. 274. See 138 Cong. Rec. at H11445. Although Mt. Health y involved a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, its analysis has been applied to ERA cases. See Dartey v. Zack Company of Chicago , 82-ERA-2 (Sec'y Apr. 25, 1983), slip op. at 9. In Mt. Healthy , the Board of Education (the "Respondent") refused to renew a non-tenured teacher's (the "Petitioner") contract because he made public statements criticizing one of the Respondent's policies. 429 U.S. at 282. The Court found that the statements constituted "speech." Id. at 285. Therefore, an adverse employment action solely based on constitutionally protected activity would violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to the Court's analysis, the employee has the burden of proof to show that the protected activity was a "motivating factor" for the adverse employment action. Id. at 287. If the employee carries that burden, the employer must show by a "preponderance of evidence" that it would have taken the same adverse action. Id.
Under new subparagraphs (b)(3)(A), however, the employee must establish that the adverse action was a "contributing factor" rather than a "motivating factor." Under new subparagraph (b)(3)(B) the employer must show by "clear and convincing" evidence, rather than by a "preponderance of the evidence," that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action.
See also the discussion in the next comment regarding whether the amendments actually relate to a mixed motive case.
(C) The Secretary may determine that a violation of subsection (a) has occurred only if the complainant has demonstrated that any behavior described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of subsection (a)(1) was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint.(D) Relief may not be ordered under paragraph (2) if the employer demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of such behavior. ,
Comment: According to Representative Ford, subparagraphs (b)(3)(C) and (D) govern the parties' burden of proof at the Administrative Law Judge level. See 138 Cong. Rec. H11444 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Ford). They apply the same standards enunciated in subparagraphs (b)(3)(A) and (B) to administrative law judge hearings. Representative Ford stated that under these paragraphs once the complainant makes a prima facie showing, a violation is established unless the employer shows by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action. Id.The new statutory language appears to be directed at the burdens in mixed motive cases, and might be best understood when viewed in the context of the amendments to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Congress amended section 703(m) of Title VII in 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)), in response to the holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228 (1989), that an employer may avoid a finding of liability if, despite considering impermissible factors in an employment decision, it establishes that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the consideration of the impermissible factor. The amendment countered this holding by amending Title VII to provide, in effect, that if an employer considers an impermissible factor, then even if the "same decision" showing is made, a violation has occurred and the plaintiff has the remedy of injunctive relief and attorney fees but not damages or reinstatement. See H.R. Rep. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 45-49, reprinted in 1991 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 583-587.
The Secretary has not recognized the impact of the amendment on Price Waterhouse , since she still cites that case in mixed motive whistleblower cases. See, e.g. , Hadley v. Quality Equipment Co. , 91-TSC-5 (Sec'y Oct. 6, 1992). Nevertheless, the Title VII amendment could have changed the analysis of whistleblower burdens on the employer-respondent. The amendment to the ERA at subparagraph (b)(3)(D), however, means that the employer will still have the completely exonerating defense of "same decision," but must establish the defense by clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance of the evidence. This seems to be a middle ground between the "violation anyway" approach in the Title VII amendment, and the current preponderance of the evidence burden on an employer raising the defense.
See also the discussion at the previous comment.
(c) Review(1) Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order issued under subsection (b) of this section may obtain review of the order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation, with respect to which the order was issued, allegedly occurred. The petition for review must be filed within sixty days from the issuance of the Secretary's order. Review shall conform to chapter 7 of the Title 5. The commencement of proceedings under this subchapter shall not, unless ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Secretary's order.
(2) An order of the Secretary with respect to which review could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in any criminal or other civil proceeding.
(d) Jurisdiction
Whenever a person has failed to comply with an order issued under subsection (b)(2) of this section, the Secretary may file a civil action in the United States district court for the district in which the violation was found to occur to enforce such order. In actions brought under this subsection, the district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary damages.
(e) Commencement of action
(1) Any person on whose behalf an order was issued under paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section may commence a civil action against the person to whom such order was issued to require compliance with such order. The appropriate United States district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such order.
(2) The court, in issuing any final order under this subsection, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.
(f) Enforcement
Any nondiscretionary duty imposed by this section shall be enforceable in a mandamus proceeding brought under section 1361 of Title 28.
(g) Deliberate violations
Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply with respect to any employee who, acting without direction from his or her employer (or the employer's agent), deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of this chapter or of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
(h) [Nonpreemption]
This section may not be construed to expand, diminish, or otherwise affect any right otherwise available to an employee under Federal or State law to redress the employee's discharge or other discriminatory action taken by the employer against the employee.
Comment : The Supreme Court stated in English v. General Electric Co. , 496 U.S. 72, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2280, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990), that the whistleblower provision of the ERA does not bar state tort law actions. In Masters v. Daniel International Corp. , 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1990), however, the Tenth Circuit held in a remand from the Supreme Court to reconsider in light of English , that although a state law claim for retaliatory discharge is not preempted by the ERA, the ERA does preclude recovery under a state law claim for retaliatory discharge because the ERA provides adequate remedies. The addition of paragraph (h) arguably overrides Masters .Paragraph (h) also may override several holdings indicating that the ERA preempts other federal remedies. See Jones v. Tennessee Valley Authority , 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25777 (6th Cir. 1991) (no private cause of action for federal employee under the U.S. Constitution); Norman v. Niagara Power Corp. , 873 F.2d 634, 637 (2d Cir. 1989) (administrative remedy under ERA is exclusive and prohibited action under Civil Rights Statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); citing Willy v. Coastal Corp. , 855 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1988) and Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Brock , 780 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied , 478 U.S. 1011, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986)).
(i) [Posting requirement]The provisions of this section shall be prominently posted in any place of employment to which this section applies.
Comments : It is not clear whether paragraph (i) establishes an independent cause of action for a complainant where an employer fails to make a posting.The failure of an employer to make a required posting could be asserted by a complainant in support of equitable tolling of the filing period. Informative on this question may be the ruling of the Sixth Circuit that the fact that NRC regulations were amended in 1982 to add information about an employee's right to protection against certain forms of discrimination did not constitute an "implicit admission" that the prior notice requirements were inadequate. The court held that the fact that the regulations now provide for more effective notice to employees through posting does not have any legal bearing on whether the prior notice was inadequate. Rose v. Dole , 945 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (complainant was asserting equitable grounds for excusing an untimely filing). Hence, under this authority, it may be argued that the Act's new posting requirement does not support an assertion of equitable tolling based on inadequate notice of whistleblowing rights.
See also Harrison v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. , 91-ERA-21 (Sec'y Oct. 6, 1992) (failure of complainant to read the respondent's posting was not a sufficient reason to toll the filing period).
[ EDITOR'S NOTE: Subsequent to preparation of this analysis, the Employment Standards Administration published for notice and comment proposed amendments to the regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 24 to implement the 1992 amendments to the ERA. In the preamble, the following is stated in regard to posting:
The requirements for posting of notices of the employee protection provisions of the ERA are also added, together with a provision that failure to post the required notice shall make the requirement that a complaint be filed with the Administrator within 180 days inoperative, unless the respondent is able to establish that the employee had actual notice of the provisions. This explicit recognition that the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled is based on case law under analogous statutes. See, for example, Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 581 F.2d 1287, 1289 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981), and Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978), arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1984), arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
59 Fed. Reg. 12508 (Mar. 16, 1994)]
(j) [Duty of NRC to investigate substantive allegations](1) The Commission or the Department of Energy shall not delay taking appropriate action with respect to an allegation of a substantial safety hazard on the basis of-
(A) the filing of a complaint under subsection (b)(1) arising from such allegation; or
(B) any investigation by the Secretary, or other action, under this section in response to such complaint.
(2) A determination by the Secretary under this section that a violation of subsection (a) has not occurred shall not be considered by the Commission or the Department of Energy in its determination of whether a substantial safety hazard exists.
Additional provisions of section 2902 of the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act that do not change language printed at 42 U.S.C. § 5851:"[(h)(3)] The second of the two sections of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 that is numbered 210 (42 U.S.C. 5851) is redesignated as section 211."
(i) APPLICABILITY.--The amendments made by this section shall apply to claims filed under section 211(b)(1) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5851(b)(1)) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Comment: President Bush signed the law on October 24, 1992.